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Fiscal policy triggers three distinct effects on the economy such as (1) interest rate effect (2) 
price effect and (3) exchange rate effect. A VAR system was developed to capture these effects 
in five South Asian countries. Empirical results suggest that budgetary action does not have 
any perceptible influence on the interest rate of the sampled countries. In terms of the price 
effect, fiscal action has opposite effects in Bangladesh and India. Fiscal action tends to 
increase aggregate price level in India but reduces the price level in Bangladesh, although 
the magnitude is very small. For Pakistan the price effect is positive but statistically 
insignificant while the price effect for Nepal and Sri Lanka is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Fiscal action is found to have no perceptible influence on the exchange rates of 
the sampled countries except Nepal where increased government expenditure tends to 
appreciate the Nepali currency. Overall, empirical findings suggest that expansionary fiscal 
action does not lead to crowding out behaviour in the sampled countries. 
 
JEL Classification: H3, H6, O1, O2 
 
Key words: Deficit financing, crowding-out, South Asia. 
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One of the bones of contention between Keynesians and Monetarists is on the effectiveness of 
fiscal action in stimulating economic activity. Monetarists argue that fiscal action is totally 
impotent in stimulating economy’s output. The inability of expansionary fiscal action in 
stimulating economy’s output is known as the “crowding out” effect. The modus operandi of 
crowding out effect is as follows: Increased government expenditure, financed either through 
taxes or through debt issuance, raises interest rate, lowers private investment and thereby 
aggregate output.  
Crowding out effect can be “total” or “partial” depending on whether expansionary 
fiscal action has either zero or less than the full multiplier effect. In an IS-LM framework, 
total crowding out takes place when the LM-curve is vertical (monetarist position). Carlson 
and Spencer (1975) demonstrate that the crowding out phenomenon is not related to the 
slopes of the IS and LM curves only. They show that crowding out can occur even without 
the LM curve being vertical. However, partial crowding out is inherent in the way the IS-LM 
framework is set up. 
 Apart from an increase in domestic interest rate induced by expansionary fiscal action, 
there are three other related macroeconomic effects that are triggered by the action. These 
relate to (1) price level increase or decrease (2) depreciation or appreciation of the domestic 
currency in response to increased government demand and (3) decreased consumption and 
increased saving in anticipation of future tax increase1.  
The price effect of fiscal action can be intuitively understood from the Fisher’s 
identity: PY = MV, where P is the aggregate price level, Y is real output of an economy, M is 
the aggregate money supply whose velocity is V.  A fiscal action that reduces Y via a 
                                                        
1 In this paper we shall not explore the Barro-Ricardo equivalence proposition as the theoretical arguments are 
not conclusive, and it is difficult to isolate the effects of changes in debt on consumption demand. 
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reduction in private investment is bound to increase the aggregate price level P.  However, in 
the absence of crowding out, a fiscal expansion unambiguously raises output which in turn 
lowers domestic price level as can be seen from Fisher’s equation. Alternatively, if the debt is 
bond financed and the monetary authorities purchase the bonds, then the initial upward 
pressure on interest rates could be avoided. However, “monetisation of public debt” can result 
in inflation through the printing of money (seignorage). 
The precise relationship between the size of the budget deficit and the increase in 
monetary base is  
budget deficit = ∆B = ∆Bp + ∆Bcb = ∆Bp + ∆BASE = ∆Bp + ∆M.   
This equation states government budget deficit equals the total increase in government debt 
outstanding, ∆B, which can be further broken down into government debt held by the public, 
∆Bp, and by the central bank, ∆Bcb. The increase in ∆Bcb translates into an increase in the 
monetary base, ∆BASE, which increases money supply, ∆M. The change in ∆BASE is 
precisely equal to the amount of seignorage collected by the government. Thus seignorage 
leads to continued money creation ultimately leading to higher inflation. 
The exchange rate effect of fiscal action can be easily seen from the national income 
identity: (X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G)2 where (X-M) represents the Current Account Balance which 
is equal to the sum of the saving-investment balance and government revenue-expenditure 
balance. Assuming saving-investment balance for simplicity, an increase in government 
expenditure will show up as a Current Account deficit in the balance of payments that tends 
to depreciate the domestic currency. A perverse, non-conventional result can also be obtained 
because of expansionary fiscal action that stimulates domestic output (barring total crowding 
out) giving rise to an increased demand for cash balances. This in turn raises domestic interest 
rates and stimulates net capital inflow appreciating the domestic currency. Hence, a fiscal 
expansion can lead either to a depreciation or appreciation of the currency. 
                                                        
2 This identity is also known as the Twin Deficit Hypothesis in the literature. 
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 Summing up, expansionary fiscal policy tends to have three related effects in the 
economy: (1) interest rate effect (2) price effect and (3) exchange rate effect. These effects are 
important and can not be ignored by policy makers, as they tend to have other secondary 
effects in the economy. 
The issue of crowding out is important to researchers and policy makers in LDCs.   
Given their inability to mobilise enough resources to achieve a desired growth rate, 
uncertainty of foreign investments and capital flows, and lack of tax elasticity, policy makers 
in LDCs have increasingly adopted deficit financing as a way of accelerating economic 
growth. Policy makers should be wary of the three adverse effects (interest rate effect, 
inflationary effect and currency depreciation) of deficit financing. Similarly, researchers are 
keen to find out if the principles of macroeconomics developed for developed economies 
worked in LDCs that are characterised by structural rigidities and constraints as elaborated by 
Taylor (1983). It would be futile to undertake a generalised policy package for LDCs without 
explicitly taking into account the specific variety of structures and set of constraints they face. 
 LDCs suffer from various constraints — in capital, wage goods and foreign exchange 
and also due to lack of effective demand. In LDCs there are sectors which exhibit fixed-price 
behaviour with mark-up pricing coupled with some sectors exhibiting flex-price behaviour as 
in agriculture. Money markets in LDCs are characterised by duality, with its organised and 
unorganised sectors, with different business practices and interest rates. Flow of funds 
between the organised and unorganised sectors sometimes takes place but the link between 
the two is very weak. It is well documented that “financial repression” and “shallow finance” 
hinder the growth in LDCs. Stiglitz (1994) pointed out seven major market failures that imply 
a potential role of state intervention. 
 Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to determine the possible effects 
of fiscal actions enumerated earlier on five LDCs in South Asia. The countries studied include 
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Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka3. These countries are also members of 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). SAARC is a regional forum of 
7 South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka) thriving to promote faster economic growth and standards of living through the 
concept of collective self-reliance, cooperation and harmony. South Asia as a region is under-
developed where approximately 20 per cent of the world’s population occupies only about 2.7 
per cent of its landmass. 
 The paper is organised in the following manner: Section II shows the trends in fiscal 
actions in the sampled countries. Section III develops the conceptual econometric framework 
of the study. A vector autoregressive regression (VAR) system is developed to capture the 
effects of fiscal action.  Section  IV contains a discussion of the empirical results obtained and 




FISCAL BALANCE IN SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
The sampled South Asian countries have consistently run budgetary deficits over the sampled 
period 1980-1999 as seen in Table A1 in the appendix. The experience over two decades 
shows that all the countries in the sample showed remarkable improvement in their fiscal 
balance with the exception of Nepal. In 1999 all the countries had their fiscal imbalance 
reduced to under 10 per cent of their GDP while in the earlier decades fiscal imbalance in 
excess of 10 per cent was the norm for a majority of these countries.  Since South Asian 
economies have constraints on taxation, government expenditures outstripped government 
revenue on a consistent basis. The constraints on taxation include narrow tax base, 
overwhelming reliance on taxes on foreign trade (export and import duties) and indirect 
taxation (sales, excise and value-added taxes). 
                                                        
3 Bhutan and Maldives are excluded from the study as consistent data are not available for these countries. 
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In 1980 taxes as a proportion of GDP ranged between 6.5 per cent in Nepal to nearly 
18 per cent in Sri Lanka (Table 1). The mean tax revenue as a proportion of GDP stood at a 
meagre 10.4 per cent in the sampled countries. Tax collection improved marginally after a 
decade in 1990 with the exception of Bangladesh. In 1990 the mean tax revenue as a 
proportion of GDP stood at 10.78 per cent.  In 1999 tax revenue as a proportion of GDP 
ranges between 7.1 per cent in India to nearly 15 per cent in Sri Lanka. The average tax 
revenue as a proportion of GDP was 10.76 which is marginally lower than the previous 
decade. 
Unless a fundamental tax reform is undertaken and implemented, tax collection will 
remain stagnant in and around the present levels in these countries. Measures of an effective, 
successful tax reform include: (1) increase or decrease of existing taxes, (2) creation of new 





Government Taxes, Expenditure and Fiscal Balance as a Percentage of GDP 
 
    
 Taxes Total Expenditures Fiscal Balance 
      1980 1990       1999 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
          
Bangladesh 6.8 5.6 7.2 17.1 12.4 15.1 -9.1 -0.4 -6.1 
India 6.9 8.0 7.1 13.8 16.5 16.2 -5.1 -4.3 -4.1 
Nepal 6.5 7.0 8.5 14.9 19.0 18.6 -6.8 -10.0 -7.7 
Pakistan 13.9 14.0 14.1 25.0 25.9 23.9 -4.8 -6.5 -6.3 
Sri Lanka 17.8 19.3 16.9 35.8 28.7 27.3 -22.5 -10.0 -8.9 
Average* 10.38 10.78 10.76 21.32 20.5 20.22 -9.66 -6.24 -6.62 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Statistical Data Base. 
* Caculated by the author. 
 
While tax revenue remained low, government expenditures as a proportion of GDP 
was high in the sampled countries and continued to remain at a high level except in Sri Lanka 
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where expenditures decreased steadily. The contributing factors for such high government 
outlays include: (1) Outlays for wages and salaries of civil service, (2) outlays on non-durable 
goods and services, including those for public sector employees, maintenance, and spending 
on military equipment, (3) interest payments on the government debt, (4) transfers to sub-
national governments (e.g., provincial, local governments etc.) and (5) subsidies and other 
transfers to state owned enterprises and individuals. Efforts are underway in the sampled 
countries to rationalise government expenditure which include progressive withdrawal of 







The conceptual framework adopted for this study is based on estimating a relevant vector 
autoregressions (VAR)4 system in line with the methodology suggested by Sims (1980). The 
VAR methodology is chosen because of its usefulness in testing the relationships between 
variables of interest without imposing structural constraints on the parameters to be estimated. 
Letting x1, x2, … xn be the endogenous variables and z1, z2, … zm be the exogenous variables, a 
VAR model in matrix notation can be written as: 
 
xt = A0 + A1 xt −1 + ... + Ap x t − p + B0 zt + B1 zt −1 + ... + B p zt − r + µt  
 
 
where A0 is an (n x 1) vector of intercept terms, A1, …., Ap are (n x n) matrices of coefficients 
that relate lagged values of endogenous variables to current values of those variables, B0, …, 
Bp are (n x m) matrices of coefficients that relate current and lagged values of the exogenous 
relate to the number of lags of the endogenous and exogenous variables respectively. 
variables to the current values of the endogenous variables and µt is an (n x 1) vector of 
                                                        
4  Vector autoregressions were introduced as an alternative approach to multi-equation modelling through the 
work of Sims (1980).  A VAR makes minimal theoretical demands on the structure of a model. With a VAR 
one needs to specify a couple of things: (1) the set of variables (endogenous and exogenous) that is believed 
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stochastic error terms known as impulses or innovations in the language of VAR. p and r. 
This model can be estimated by OLS and will yield consistent and efficient estimates of the 
coefficients.  
 In this study a four-variable VAR is appropriate with interest rate (R), price level (P), 
investment (I) and exchange rate (E) being identified as the endogenous variables, while 
budget deficit (BD) and private unrequited transfer (PUT) are the exogenous variables of the 
model.  































































I t = α 3 +
i =1
m
∑ B3 i Rt − i +
i =1
p
∑ γ 3 i Pt − i +
i =1
q
∑ δ 3 i I t −1 +
i =1
r
∑ θ3 i E t −i + Ψ31 BD t + Ψ32 PUT + ε3 t  (3) 
 
E t = α 4 +
i=1
m
∑ B4i Rt − i +
i =1
p
∑ γ 4i Pt −i +
i =1
q
∑ δ4 i It−1 +
i =1
r
∑ θ4 i E t− i + Ψ41 BD t + Ψ42 PUT + ε4 t  (4) 
 
 
 Where  Rt = Interest rate in period t; 
   Pt = Price level (CPI) in period t; 
   It = Gross domestic investment (GDI) in period t; 
   Et = Exchange rate (domestic currency/US$) in period t; 
   BDt = Budget deficit in period t; 
   PUTt = Private unrequited transfer in period t; and 





                                                                                                                                                                             
to be relevant and (2) the maximum lag lengths that are needed to capture most of the effects that the 







Data for our model are extracted from the World Bank’s World Table (various issues) and 
IMF’s International Financial Statistical Year Book (various issues). While the identity of 
some of the variables are clearly defined, it must be pointed out that we have used the 
discount rate in our definition of (R), CPI as a measure for price level (P) and gross domestic 
investment in our definition of (I). 
 We have estimated equations 1-4 by OLS5 for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka. The other two members of SAARC namely Bhutan and Maldives have been left 
out since data on some of the variables could not be obtained on a consistent basis. A 
parsimonious representation of the model based on model adequacy and other diagnostics is 
presented in Tables 2-5. The goodness of fit (R2-adjusted) of the model is very good and 
ranges between 42 per cent for Nepal and 92 percent for Pakistan. Durbin’s h-statistic does 
not exceed the critical value of  –1.96 < h < 1.96 signifying the lack of autocorrelation in the 
errors terms. Based on the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (B-P-G) test we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity since the observed chi-square does not exceed the critical 
value of 12.5916 with 6 degrees of freedom at the 5 per cent level of significance. Ramsey’s 
RESET test shows the model is adequate and there is no specification error since the observed 
F-value does not exceed the critical F-value of 4.41 with 1 and 18 degrees of freedom at the 5 





                                                        
5  One can use Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique to estimate the four equations. Since 
each equation contains the same number of lagged endogenous variables, the OLS estimation of each 





Interest Rate Effect of Fiscal Action 
 
     
 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Rt-1 0.81474 0.51062 0.57202 0.9501 0.78928 
t-value 7.018 2.9 3.372 4.211 3.849 
Pt-1 -3.66E-04 6.04E-04 4.07E-04 -9.74E-04 3.41E-04 
t-value -1.093 1.868 0.8053 -1.292 0.5972 
Et-1 6.58E-04 -6.11E-04 -1.85E-03 1.56E-03 -1.82E-04 
t-value 0.721 -0.9342 -1.181 1.015 -7.77E-02 
It-1 1.89E-15 -9.81E-06 2.06E-08 5.74E-04 -5.88E-04 
t-value 6.06E-03 -0.7663 1.60E-02 1.973 -0.9514 
BD 9.78E-14 6.55E-05 1.71E-07 3.56E-04 -5.79E-04 
t-value 0.2483 1.785 6.58E-02 1.679 -0.685 
Transfer 2.06E-11 -9.98E-09 -4.89E-05 3.53E-06 1.22E-05 
t-value 2.751 -8.03E-03 -0.213 0.6287 0.1828 
Constant 1.92E-02 2.84E-02 5.96E-02 2.27E-02 1.25E-02 
t-value 2.377 2.989 2.399 1.918 0.7678 
R2-Adjusted 0.7932 0.8998 0.4161 0.9176 0.8741 
Durbin's h -1.531 -0.60948 1.0853 Can not be 
calculated 
Can not be 
calculated 
B-P-G Test (DF=6) 7.325 5.537 5.86 11.073 8.051 
RESET (2) Test (DF1=1 
& DF2=18) 
0.16821 2.895 2.01E-02 1.7247 3.65E-02 
      
 
 
The primary point of interest is the coefficient associated with the variable BD. First, 
the estimated coefficient is positive for all countries (except Sri Lanka) but it is very small in 
magnitude. Secondly, the coefficient of BD is statistically insignificant for all countries at the 
usual 5 per cent level of significance. However, the coefficient of BD for India becomes 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level (critical value = 1.729 with 19 degrees of 
freedom). Based on the above results we can conclude that budgetary action does not have 
any perceptible influence on the domestic interest of the sampled countries. Nevertheless, if 
we relax the level of significance to 10 per cent, we see that budgetary action tends to raise 
domestic interest rate in the Indian economy. 
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The above finding that government budget deficits have no significant effect on 
interest rates is consistent with a large number of studies namely Giannaros and Kolluri 
(1989), Darrat (1989, 1990) and Findlay (1990)6. 
Table 3 summarises the results of fiscal action on the aggregate price level. The model 
has an excellent fit with a very high R2 in excess of 99 per cent for all countries. The model 
has no autocorrelation based on the Durbin’s h-statistic and errors are homoskedastic based 
on the B-P-G test. The model is also adequate as shown by the RESET test. 
Once again our primary concern centres on the coefficient of BD. Once again, the 
coefficient is small in magnitude for all countries in our sample. However, it is positive for 
India and Pakistan but the coefficient is statistically insignificant for Pakistan but statistically 
significant for India at the 10 per cent level. In the case of Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, 
the coefficient of BD is negative. In terms of statistical significance the coefficient of BD is 
insignificant for Nepal and Sri Lanka but is significant in the case of Bangladesh. Thus, in 
terms of the price effect, fiscal action has opposite effects in Bangladesh and India. 
Expansionary fiscal action tends to increase aggregate price level in India but reduces the 
price level in Bangladesh, although the magnitude of increase or decrease is very small 
indeed.  
Our finding on the possible relationship between the rate of inflation and deficits fits 
in with a wide variety of empirical studies done elsewhere. Crozier (1976) found no causal 
relationship between deficits and the Canadian inflationary surge in the 1970s7. 
 
 
                                                        
6 In contrast, Zahid (1988) and Liargovas et al. (1997) have found that large government deficits cause high 
interest rates. 
7 Other studies found a positive relationship between deficits and inflation. These include Hafer and Hein (1988) 





Price Effect of Fiscal Action 
 
      
 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Rt-1 73.771 -187.56 29.144 63.34 55.909 
t-value 2.446 -1.864 0.5592 1.107 0.6992 
Pt-1 1.01E+00 1.43E+00 1.01E+00 7.78E-01 1.12E+00 
t-value 11.56 7.745 6.5 4.073 5.039 
Et-1 -1.67E-01 -1.74E-01 4.70E-01 7.25E-01 2.06E-01 
t-value -0.7048 -0.4668 0.9751 1.864 2.26E-01 
It-1 -8.00E-12 -8.39E-03 -3.50E-04 1.14E-01 -1.43E-01 
t-value -9.87E-02 -1.147 -8.85E-01 1.549 -0.5936 
BD -2.22E-10 3.87E-02 -1.26E-03 7.81E-03 -0.27097 
t-value -2.167 1.844 -1.57E+00 0.1454 -0.8228 
Transfer 7.03E-09 3.76E-04 -5.65E-02 2.17E-04 -1.18E-02 
t-value 3.608 5.29E-01 -0.7995 0.1526 -0.4561 
Constant -1.76E-01 5.20E+00 -3.48E+00 -6.64E-01 -6.10E+00 
t-value -8.36E-02 0.9573 -0.4554 -0.2211 -0.9586 
R2-Adjusted 0.9982 0.9973 0.9972 0.9987 0.9955 
Durbin's h 1.972 -3.84E-01 -0.13941 1.4083 Can not be 
calculated 
B-P-G Test (DF=6) 10.385 3.782 4.124 3.098 4.385 
RESET (2) Test 
(DF1=1) & DF2=18 
0.975 4.974 1.62 0.973 2.84 




   
Table 4 contains the result of fiscal action on the exchange rates of the sampled 







Exchange Rate Effect Of Fiscal Action 
 
      
 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Rt-1 4.67E+01 -20.136 15.494 -51.737 27.719 
t-value 2.368 -0.6326 1.312 -2.134 1.129 
Pt-1 9.89E-02 9.35E-02 -6.21E-02 1.38E-01 7.77E-02 
t-value 1.738 1.598 -1.766 1.705 1.136 
Et-1 0.55362 8.31E-01 1.09E+00 6.02E-01 7.52E-01 
t-value 3.572 7.025 9.996 3.648 2.68E+00 
It-1 4.82E-12 8.46E-04 -4.18E-05 -1.76E-02 -8.44E-02 
t-value 9.10E-02 0.3656 -0.4656 -0.5627 -1.14E+00 
BD 3.47E-11 8.62E-03 -1.16E-03 1.28E-02 -5.45E-02 
t-value 0.5181 1.299 -6.43E+00 0.5617 -0.5391 
Transfer -2.20E-10 -5.02E-04 3.77E-03 -7.82E-04 3.78E-03 
t-value -0.1727 -2.24E+00 0.2354 -1.296 0.4743 
Constant -1.44E-01 9.43E-02 -1.06E+00 4.02E+00 -1.09E+00 
t-value -1.05E-01 5.49E-02 -0.6111 3.158 -0.556 
R2-Adjusted 0.986 0.9885 0.9973 0.988 0.9893 
Durbin's h 0.19455 -7.35E-01 -1.7372 -1.2636 Can not be 
calculated 
B-P-G Test (DF=6) 8.246 8.47 10.119 9.765 6.159 
RESET (2) Test 
(DF1=1 & DF2=18) 
0.92183 3.3645 3.45E+00 0.28041 1.05E+00 
      
 
 
seems to be no autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity as shown by Durbin’s h-statistic and B-P-
G test respectively. The RESET test also indicates that the model is adequate and properly 
specified. 
In Table 4 the primary focus is on the magnitude, sign and significance of the 
coefficient of BD. The coefficients are very small in magnitude for the sampled economies. 
Secondly, the coefficients are positive for Bangladesh, India and Pakistan but are statistically 
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insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficients are negative but statistically significant for 
Nepal and negative but statistically insignificant for Sri Lanka. Thus, it may be concluded that 
fiscal action does not have any perceptible influence on the exchange rates of the sampled 
countries except Nepal where increased government expenditure tends to appreciate the 
Nepali currency. This is a non-conventional result but can be theoretically justified by the 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study has examined the issue of crowding out phenomenon along with its related effects 
of fiscal actions in five South Asian economies using a VAR model. Based on the results we 
found that budgetary action does not have any perceptible influence on the domestic interest 
of the sample countries. Nevertheless, if we relax the level of significance to 10 per cent, 
there is evidence of budgetary action tending to raise domestic interest rate in the Indian 
economy. Earlier study by Kulkarni and Erickson (1995) on India found no interest rate effect 
due to fiscal action. Kulkarni and Erickson (1975) argued that interest rates in India are 
controlled by the Reserve Bank of India and banks follow the guidelines set by the Reserve 
Bank. 
In terms of the price effect, fiscal action has opposite effects in Bangladesh and India 
and no price effect in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Expansionary fiscal action tends to 
increase aggregate price level in India but reduces the price level in Bangladesh, although the 
magnitude of increase or decrease is very small.  
 Lastly, it was found that fiscal action does not have any perceptible influence on the 
exchange rates of the sampled countries except Nepal where increased government 
expenditure tends to appreciate the Nepali currency. This is a non-conventional result. Such a 
result can be theoretically explained by the monetary theory of exchange rate determination. 
                                                        
8 Refer to Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1994) Chapter 19. 
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 The results obtained in this study have enormous policy implications for LDCs. The 
results will allay fears among policy planners in LDCs about the alleged deleterious effects of 
fiscal actions. Thus, more and not less of fiscal actions is recommended for accelerating 
























      
1970 na -13.6 24 -3.94 -0.873 
1971 na -16 -39 -3.069 -1.023 
1972 na -21.8 -125.8 -2.583 -1.168 
1973 -864000000.00 -17 -222.8 -4.554 -0.960 
1974 -330000096.00 -23.600 -247.6 -5.145 -0.767 
1975 1444000000.00 -31.970 -236.4 -11.466 -1.704 
1976 -3728000000.00 -36.870 -422.0 -12.239 -2.518 
1977 209000000.00 -37.930 -575.7 -12.580 -1.671 
1978 4273999872.00 -50.790 -582.0 -13.247 -5.290 
1979 874000128.00 -62.980 -587.7 -17.997 -6.300 
1980 4976001024.00 -88.630 -705.0 -13.344 -12.157 
1981 -7395999744.00 -87.320 -728.2 -16.138 -10.518 
1982 3135000064.00 -107.340 -1590.5 -15.351 -13.927 
1983 9002999808.00 -133.310 -2953.9 -24.784 -12.846 
1984 2872999936.00 -175.800 -2984.9 -25.928 -10.482 
1985 -5923999744.00 -222.540 -3379.6 -33.783 -15.678 
1986 -2600999936.00 -271.950 -3637.0 -46.917 -18.202 
1987 -6625000960.00 -278.810 -3902.4 -48.783 -17.073 
1988 -5880999936.00 -320.600 -4280.3 -42.426 -28.195 
1989 -2828000000.00 -361.790 -8013.5 -56.982 -21.778 
1990 -7375709 -434.580 -7013.2 -46.232 -25.153 
1991 na -358.260 -9915.0 -77.105 -35.197 
1992 na -399.090 -10054.0 -95.418 -22.912 
1993 na -605.280 -10359.0 -118.999 -32.084 
1994 na -567.530 -7463.0 -108.591 -49.474 
1995 na -656.937 -10001.0 -89.291 -55.196 
1996 14317600000 -648.420 -12563.0 -90.00 -59.931 
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